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ABSTRACT 
This paper contributes to the literature on the labor market consequences of 
obesity by using a novel instrument: genetic risk score, which reflects the 
predisposition to higher body mass index across many genetic loci. We estimate IV 
models of the effect of BMI on labor market outcomes using Finnish data that have 
many strengths: e.g. body mass index that is measured rather than self-reported, and 
data on earnings and social income transfers that are from administrative tax records 
and are thus free of the problems associated with non-response, reporting error or top-
coding. 
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The empirical results are sensitive to whether we use a narrower or broader 
genetic risk score, and to model specification. For example, models using the 
narrower genetic risk score as an instrument imply that a one-unit increase in BMI is 
associated with 6.9% lower wages, 1.8% fewer years employed, and a 3 percentage 
point higher probability of receiving any social income transfers. However, when we 
use a newer, broader, genetic risk score, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect. Future research using genetic risk scores should examine the sensitivity of their 
results to the risk score used. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The prevalence of obesity, defined as a body mass index (BMI) of 30 or 
higher,1 has risen dramatically in many countries in the past several decades (GBD 
2015 Obesity Collaborators, 2017). Economists have extensively studied the 
economic consequences of obesity, in particular whether obesity lowers wages or 
reduces the probability of employment (see the reviews in Averett, 2011; Cawley, 
2015). Obesity could result in worse labor market performance for several reasons; 
e.g. obesity worsens health (Hu, 2008) which may lower productivity and thus wages, 
and there may be obesity-related discrimination in the labor market (Puhl, 2011; 
Rooth, 2009).   
Correlations between weight and labor market outcomes are difficult to 
interpret. They reflect not only any impact of weight on earnings, but also any reverse 
causality that would arise if a low income results in weight gain (see e.g. Schmeiser, 
2009), and the influence of any omitted variables such as rate of time preference 
(Komlos et al., 2004). For this reason, numerous studies have sought to estimate the 
causal effect of weight on labor market outcomes. Most have instrumented for 
respondent weight using the weight of a biological relative; e.g. Cawley (2004), 
Brunello and D’Hombres (2007), Kline and Tobias (2008), and Lindeboom et al. 
(2010). This approach takes advantage of the substantial genetic variation in weight; 
genetics studies estimate a strong heritable component of BMI, roughly 40-70% 
(Barsh et al., 2000; Pietiläinen et al., 1999; Locke et al., 2015). A potential concern 
with the approach is that unobserved characteristics may be correlated with both a 
person’s own BMI and their relative’s BMI.  
                                                 
1 BMI is calculated as a person’s weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 
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This paper contributes to the literature by using a novel instrument – genetic 
risk score for high BMI – to estimate the causal effect of weight on labor market 
outcomes. This instrument takes advantage of the natural experiment known as 
Mendelian Randomization, which refers to the draw of an individual’s genotype at 
conception (Conley, 2016; Haycock et al., 2016; von Hinke et al., 2016; Tyrrell et al., 
2016; Davey Smith et al., 2017).2 We utilize two different genetic risk scores for high 
BMI; a narrower one based on 32 SNPs3 and a broader one based on 97 SNPs that 
have robustly and significantly been found to influence obesity in genome-wide 
association studies involving very large samples. We discuss the power and validity 
of these instruments in detail in the Methods section. 
In addition to the genetic IVs, the data we use has three noteworthy strengths. 
First, it includes measurements, as opposed to self-reports, of weight and height; thus, 
we avoid the problems arising from reporting error in weight such as inefficiency and 
bias (see Cawley et al., 2015; Courtemanche et al., 2015). Second, we utilize 
administrative data on earnings, which avoids problems associated with refusal to 
report, and reporting error in wages and salaries. Third, the data allow us to examine a 
novel outcome – social income transfers, taken from administrative records, which 
allows us to examine one potential negative externality related to obesity. Studying 
the existence and magnitude of such external costs is important because they may be 
associated with deadweight loss to society and thus represent an economic rationale 
for government intervention to prevent and reduce obesity (Cawley, 2015). Social 
                                                 
2 Norton and Han (2008) used genetic information as an instrument for weight to estimate the effect of 
weight on labor market outcomes, although the specific genetic IVs were later called into question as 
relatively weak and likely invalid (Cawley, Han, and Norton, 2011; von Hinke et al., 2016). 
3 Places where DNA differ between people are called polymorphisms, and a single nucleotide 
polymorphism or SNP is a single base-pair variation in DNA. Humans have two copies of each 
chromosome, so they have two alleles, or versions, of each SNP that may be the same (homozygous) or 
different (heterozygous). See Appendix A of von Hinke Kessler Scholder et al. (2012). 
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income transfers are also of interest because they tend to be a substantial item in 
government budgets, especially in countries like Finland with a comprehensive social 
safety net.  
One study similar to this one is Tyrrell et al. (2016), which estimated the 
effect of obesity on labor market outcomes using genetic information as an instrument 
for BMI, and found that higher BMI lowered annual household income for women. 
Our study differs in significant ways from theirs. We use a measure of income that is 
more accurate for several reasons. Tyrrell et al. (2016) used a self-reported categorical 
income; in contrast, our paper uses administrative income data from national registers 
which avoids problems of refusal and reporting error. In addition, our measure of 
income is continuous rather than categorical. Moreover, the self-reported income in 
Tyrrell et al. (2016) is for the household, whereas our administrative information 
measures earnings specific to the individual that are more relevant for studying the 
consequences of individual weight. Furthermore, Tyrell et al. (2016) examined 
outcomes in a single year whereas we examine outcomes over 12 years. We also 
examine additional outcomes – employment, and receipt of social income transfers – 
and use data from Finland instead of the U.K. 
2. DATA 
We link data from three sources: 1) the Cardiovascular Risk in Young Finns 
Study (YFS); 2) the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data (FLEED) of 
Statistics Finland (SF); and 3) the Longitudinal Population Census (LPC) of SF. The 
merge is executed using unique personal identifiers, which is exact matching; i.e. 
there are no misreported ID codes.  
The YFS is an on-going epidemiological study that began in 1980 with the 
goal of examining how childhood cardiovascular risk factors and health behaviors, as 
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well as biological and psychological factors, contribute to the risk of cardiovascular 
diseases in adulthood.4 Subjects in six age cohorts (aged 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 and 18 years) 
were randomly chosen from the five university hospital districts of Finland using the 
national population register (Raitakari et al., 2008).5 The sample is relatively small – 
3,596 persons participated in the study at baseline – but the richness of the data are an 
offsetting advantage. Eight waves of data have been collected in 3-9 year intervals, 
starting with baseline in 1980 and most recently in 2011-12, with response rates 
between 60% and 80%. We use data from the 2001, 2007 and 2011 waves, because 
we have, from another source, labor market data for the years 1990-2012 (as we 
explain below).  
The YFS data are collected through questionnaires, physical measurements, 
and blood tests. In all waves of the YFS, weight and height were measured to the 
nearest 0.1 kg by medical professionals at local health centers.  
In 2009, genome-wide association studies (GWAS) were performed for YFS 
subjects using the 670K Illumina platform (Sanger Institute, UK). Variation in over 
670,000 known single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) were measured from 2,450 
study subjects. Imputation for up to 2.5 million SNPs was performed using 
information on Hapmap 2 by using MACH. All the SNPs were imputed with 
excellent imputation quality (MACH r2>0.8). These genetic data were used to 
construct the genetic risk scores, which will be explained in detail in the Methods 
section. 
The second dataset that we use, the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee 
Data (FLEED), is the source for data on employment status, salary, and other income, 
                                                 
4 YFS is the largest running follow-up study in Europe that evaluates cardiovascular risk factors from 
childhood to adulthood; see http://youngfinnsstudy.utu.fi/studydesign.html  
5 Finland is divided into 20 hospital districts, five of which are university hospital districts. 
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for 2001 to 2012. FLEED data come directly from tax and other administrative 
registers that are collected and/or maintained by SF. Such register-based data have 
much less measurement error than self-reports from surveys; e.g. the income data in 
FLEED do not suffer from underreporting or recall error, nor are they top coded. This 
accuracy increases the efficiency of the estimates, which is particularly important for 
relatively small samples such as the YFS. The third dataset that we use, the 
Longitudinal Population Census (LPC), is the source of information on parental 
education. 
3. METHODS 
We estimate regressions of the following form: 
   (1) 
We examine four labor market outcomes Y for an individual i. Out of a 
concern that short-term cross-sectional measures, such as yearly earnings or current 
employment status, contain idiosyncratic components that diminish the precision of 
the estimates (Dahl et al., 2011), in this paper, Y is usually the average of the values 
over 2001 to 2012, which is the period that most respondents were of working age 
(i.e. between 24 and 50). Because the sample size is relatively small, reduction in 
variance and precision gains from averaging over several periods are important.  
The first outcome we examine is the logarithm of the average of the 
individual’s annual wage and salary earnings over 2001-2012. The second dependent 
variable is labor market attachment; specifically: the share of years employed during 
2001-2012, with employment status in a year classified by the individual’s status in 
the last week of each year in FLEED. Retirement is not an issue for this sample; the 
YFS participants are between 35 and 50 years old in 2012. 
i i i iY W Xα β γ ε= + + +
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The third dependent variable we examine is an indicator variable for whether 
the respondent received any social income transfers between 2001 and 2012, and the 
fourth and final dependent variable is the logarithm of the average of the individual’s 
annual social income transfers over the period 2001-2012, conditional on receiving 
any. These last two outcomes jointly represent a two-part model, in which the first 
part concerns whether the respondent received any social income transfers, and the 
second part concerns the average annual amount received, conditional on receiving 
any. Social income transfers include unemployment benefits, housing benefits and 
disability payments.6 We examine their receipt for two reasons: first, social income 
transfers are an important component of total income in Finland, a welfare state, and 
second, the amount of social income transfers is informative about adverse labor 
market consequences and negative externalities related to obesity. For both 
wages/earnings and social income transfers, the values in each year are converted to 
constant (inflation-adjusted) values using the consumer price index (base year 2000) 
before the average is calculated. 
The regressor of interest is weight W. In our primary models, we use BMI 
measured in 2001. Thus, the main estimates are based on cross-sectional variation 
across individuals in the value of BMI in 2001. BMI has only limited variation for 
each individual over the relatively short observation window (2001, 2007 and 2011) 
and thus it is not feasible to estimate individual fixed effects models.  
                                                 
6 We exclude parental leave benefits from social income transfers because they are not a “negative 
indicator” in the same way as unemployment benefits and disability payments. Parental leave benefits 
are also strongly earnings-related in Finland. We focus on social income transfers that are indicators of 
poor labor market success and markers of negative externalities related to obesity. We have estimated 
the baseline models also by including parental leave benefits to the measure of social income transfers. 
The conclusions remain intact. Persons being on parental leave are coded as employed according to 
Statistics Finland, because parental leave does not dissolve the legal status of employment contract.  
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The vector of controls X includes indicator variables for birth month, birth 
year and gender. Typically, wage equations include education as a regressor (Mincer, 
1974). In this case that practice is questionable, as there is some evidence that youth 
obesity may reduce academic performance and educational attainment (Sabia, 2007; 
von Hinke Kessler Scholder et al., 2012). For this reason, we omit respondent 
education from the set of regressors and instead control for parental education: 
specifically, whether each parent has completed at least bachelor’s degree (based on 
LPC data from 1980). Controlling for parental education also accounts for assortative 
mating within educational groups that could potentially violate the independence 
assumption of the IV estimation; i.e. it accounts for the possibility that the allele 
distribution differs according to parental education (Von Hinke et al., 2016). Parental 
education is also a convenient control for family environment and resources. 
Wage equations sometimes include controls for cognitive performance, when 
the data are available. In this context, however, that is questionable because there is 
evidence that obesity lowers scores on tests of cognitive achievement (Sabia, 2007; 
Averett and Stifel, 2010).7   
Given the modest sample size, the main models in our paper are estimated for 
men and women pooled, and thus represent the average effect across both sexes. 
However, previous studies of the impact of weight on earnings have often found 
differences by gender (e.g. Cawley, 2004), so as an extension in the Appendix we also 
estimate models separately by gender.8 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 1 for description of the measures for cognitive performance.    
8 Finland also exhibits a gender difference in wage penalty of obesity (Sarlio-Lähteenkorva et al., 
2004; Johansson et al., 2009). 
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We first estimate equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) in order to 
estimate the conditional correlation of weight with labor market outcomes.9 These 
correlations reflect not only any causal effect of weight on wages, but also potentially 
reverse causality and the influence of omitted variables that may be correlated with 
both weight and the outcomes. 
3.1. Method of instrumental variables: Genetic risk score for obesity 
In order to estimate the causal effect of body weight on these outcomes, we 
estimate models of instrumental variables (IV) in which our IV is one of the two 
genetic risk scores for BMI.10 It is estimated that 40-70% of inter-individual 
variability in BMI is due to genetic factors (e.g. Locke et al., 2015), so the genetic 
risk factor score has the potential to be a powerful instrument. 
As described in the data section, subjects in the YFS contributed DNA 
samples; results of the analysis of these samples are used to construct genetic risk 
scores (GRS) for high BMI. We use two different measures of GRS for high BMI.  
The first is based on the 32 SNPs that were found to be significantly (p<1.0 x 10-8) 
associated with high BMI by Speliotes et al. (2010) and which is used as an example 
of a powerful and likely valid application of genes as instruments by von Hinke et al. 
(2016). The second genetic risk score is based on 97 SNPs identified as associated 
with high BMI by Locke et al. (2015). This second, broader GRS includes all of the 
32 SNPs included in the first, narrower, GRS. While the 32 SNP score was used by 
von Hinke Kessler Scholder (2016), the 97 SNP score has not, to our knowledge, been 
used in any study examining the economic consequences of obesity.  
                                                 
9 For the binary outcome of receiving any social income transfers we estimate linear probability 
models. We prefer the use of linear probability models, because they facilitate easy interpretation of 
coefficients and are less sensitive to distributional assumptions. The results remain intact using a Tobit 
specification, where the social income transfers are left censored at zero.  
10 For all outcomes, the IV model is two-stage least squares. 
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The first GRS is equal to the sum of the alleles in the 32 SNPs that put one at 
elevated risk of high BMI. A person’s risk score is equal to the number of alleles they 
have that are associated with an elevated risk of high BMI; because each person has 
either 0, 1, or 2 alleles for each of the relevant SNPs, the first GRS (based on 32 
SNPs) ranges from 0 to 64. The second GRS (based on 97 SNPs) is available to us 
only in weighted form; the weights are based on the contribution of each SNP to high 
BMI in a meta-analysis. This difference in weighting explains the difference in means 
between the two risk scores shown in Appendix Table A2. The weighting may not be 
ideal in this context because the weights are based on all of the international data used 
in the meta-analysis, but the YFS represented only 0.8% of these observations, and 
thus the weights are not necessarily appropriate or best for the Finnish sample we 
study.  
The genetic risk scores have two advantages as an instrument: first, they are 
more powerful (explain more variation in weight) than any of the SNPs individually; 
and second, they may be more valid because they reduce the risk that any alternative 
biological pathway (pleiotropy) in any individual SNP will bias the IV results (Davey 
Smith, 2011; Palmer et al., 2012); the reason is that the instrument is a count of 
number of alleles associated with high BMI instead of indicator variables for having 
specific alleles of specific SNPs.11 
Speliotes et al. (2010) report that the mechanisms by which these SNPs affect 
weight are through: 1) regulators of appetite or energy balance; and 2) insulin 
secretion or response. It is estimated that the 32 loci that constitute the first risk score 
explain 1.45% of the variation in BMI (Speliotes et al., 2010) and the 97 SNPs in the 
                                                 
11 Using simulations comparing different methods, Palmer et al. (2012, p. 239) provide evidence that 
supports the use of genetic scores over indicator variables for individual SNPs. 
14 
 
second risk score explain 2.7% of the variation in BMI (Locke et al., 2015).12 (Even 
though it is estimated that 40-70% of inter-individual variation in BMI is due to 
genetic factors, all currently-identified SNPs explain several percentage points of the 
variation; in other words, the vast majority of genetic variability in BMI remains 
unexplained; see, e.g., Locke et al., 2015.) Each one-unit increase in the first genetic 
risk factor score was associated with an increase in BMI of 0.17 units, or roughly one-
half of a kilogram of weight for an average-sized adult (Speliotes et al., 2010). This 
same instrument (an unweighted risk score based on the 32 SNPs associated with 
obesity by Speliotes et al., 2010) was also used in von Hinke (2016) as an example of 
a valid and powerful application of genes as instruments; they used the IV to estimate 
the effect of fat mass on academic achievement and blood pressure. 
A threat to the validity of genetic instruments is pleiotropy – genes having 
more than one function (see, e.g., von Hinke et al., 2016; Cawley, Han, and Norton 
2011). For example, if the same genes associated with higher weight were also 
associated with unrelated traits or conditions that affect employment or earnings, then 
those genes are invalid instruments because the exclusion restriction is violated.  
There is a possible tradeoff between power and validity associated with using 
a broader SNP risk score (i.e. one based on more SNPs). The advantage is that it a 
broader risk score may be more powerful (explains more variation in BMI), given that 
it is based on additional SNPs.13 However, there is also a risk that some of those 
additional SNPs will also be correlated with other traits that affect labor market 
                                                 
12 Speliotes et al. (2010) reports that the SNP with the greatest explanatory power for BMI is FTO 
(which explains 0.34% of variation in BMI), and that having the risky allele for FTO is associated with 
20.3% greater odds of obesity. We have also estimated models in which the IV is a genetic risk score in 
which each SNP is weighted based on their effect size in the meta-analysis; this was no more powerful 
in the first stage than the unweighted genetic risk score. 
13 When the 97 SNP score is used as an instrument, the F-statistics of that instrument in the first stage 
of IV range from 52 to 63, depending the specification. Using the 32 SNP GRS the first-stage F-
statistics varied between 23 and 40. 
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outcomes (pleiotropy) and thus there may be a greater risk of bias in the IV estimates. 
The two genetic risk scores we use are correlated but far from perfectly (0.64, which 
is statistically significant at the 1% level). Moreover, the SNPs most strongly 
correlated with the trait are usually identified first and thus are likely to already be 
included in the 32 SNP score. 
We investigate the possibility of pleiotropy two ways. First, we check 
whether, in the genetics literature, the genes significantly associated with BMI are 
also significantly associated with other possible determinants of labor market 
outcomes. Speliotes et al. (2010) and Locke et al. (2015) search the genetics literature 
for evidence of any pleiotropy of the BMI-related SNPs. Of the SNPs linked to BMI, 
some have been linked to waist circumference and waist-to-hip ratio, but these are 
clearly related to weight. Some are associated with height, a component of BMI 
(Speliotes et al., 2010).14 
Some SNPs are linked to obesity-related illnesses; these could be either 
downstream effects of a high BMI, but it is also possible that coincidentally the SNPs 
affect these illnesses through pathways other than obesity. Specifically, some SNPs in 
the risk score are associated with either Type 2 diabetes, fasting glucose, fasting 
insulin, or insulin resistance, which is not surprising given that excess fat (by 
secreting the hormone resistin) causes insulin resistance and thus diabetes (Hu, 2008). 
Some are linked to serum cholesterol levels and one to blood pressure; both of these 
conditions are strongly associated with obesity (e.g. Hu, 2008). Some are associated 
with age of onset of menstruation (menarche), but this too is related to fatness (Wang, 
2002; Kaplowitz, 2008). In summary, the other phenotypes that the obesity-related 
                                                 
14 We report the results additionally controlling for height in the working paper version. The 
conclusions remain intact. 
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SNPs are associated with tend to be obesity-related comorbidities. We assume that the 
associations with obesity-related conditions occur because of the SNPs association 
with high BMI, but acknowledge that it could be through other pathways, which could 
threaten the validity of the instrument.  It is noteworthy that the searches of Speliotes 
et al. (2010) and Locke et al. (2015) did not yield evidence that the SNPs associated 
with high BMI are associated with characteristics unrelated to obesity that might 
directly affect labor market outcomes, such as intelligence. 
As a second check of the validity of the genetic instruments, we follow 
McClellan et al. (1994) and divide our sample into those with an above-average and 
below-average value of the instrument, and test whether the two groups significantly 
differ in their observable characteristics that are likely correlated with the second-
stage outcome. It is impossible to confirm the null hypothesis that the instrument is 
uncorrelated with the second-stage error term, but a lack of correlation between the 
instrument and observed variables would be consistent with the exclusion 
restriction.15 These comparisons will be discussed in the Empirical Results section. 
An additional assumption is that the allele distribution does not vary 
systematically in different population subgroups (von Hinke et al., 2016). There are 
two key facts that support the independence assumption in our setting. First, our data 
originate from Finland, which is ethnically very homogeneous. Second, following von 
Hinke et al. (2016), we have tested whether the distribution of our covariates is the 
same across the instrument distribution by regressing each of the covariates on the 
instrument. In Appendix Table A1, we report p-values associated with a joint test 
based on regressing a covariate on each of the 32 SNPs and then testing whether the 
                                                 
15 Comparing distribution of observables between above- versus below-average genetic score does not 
address the potential concern about the remaining endogeneity stemming from unobservables. 
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32 coefficients on the SNPs are jointly equal to zero. In Column 2 of Appendix Table 
A1, the p-values indicate that, for each covariate, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients on the 32 SNPs in the first score are jointly equal to zero.  
However, in Column 4, the p-values indicate that we can reject the null for the 97 
SNPs for the following covariates: female, age, marital status, and father’s income in 
1980. Thus, the additional SNPs in the broader risk score may vary systematically in 
population subgroups. The evidence on this point is more supportive of the 
identifying assumptions for the narrower 32 SNP score than for the broader 97 SNP 
score.  
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Baseline OLS estimates 
OLS estimates are presented in Column 1 of Table I.16 In OLS regressions, a one-unit 
increase in BMI is associated with: 0.7% lower average earnings, 0.2% fewer years 
spent employed, 0.1 percentage point lower probability of any social income 
transfers, and 0.5% lower social income transfers, none of which are statistically 
significant.17   
4.2. Power and validity of the IV Model 
Because we seek to estimate the causal effect of BMI on these outcomes, we 
next estimate IV models. The genetic risk score for BMI is a powerful instrument for 
BMI. In the first stage of IV, the F-statistic on the instrument varies by outcome, but 
ranges between 23.5 and 39.9 for the 32 SNP genetic risk score, and between 52.0 and 
                                                 
16 Appendix Table A2 reports summary statistics for our regression sample. 
17 We estimate several additional models to assess the robustness of the baseline results using the 
narrower score (Appendix 3).   
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62.7 for the 97 SNP genetic risk score; all of these far exceed the minimum standard 
of F=10 suggested in Staiger and Stock (1997).18  
In order to examine the validity of the genetic instruments, Appendix Table 
A3 presents differences in means of the observed variables for those with above- and 
below-average values of the BMI genetic risk score, and tests for equality of the 
means. As expected, those with above-average genetic risk factor scores have a 
significantly higher BMI (by 0.92 units for the 32 SNP GRS and by 0.96 units for the 
97 SNP GRS); this is consistent with the instrument being powerful. The table also 
shows that those with a higher genetic 32 SNP risk score for obesity have 
significantly lower earnings, which is consistent with BMI worsening labor market 
outcomes. The difference in earnings for those with a high and low value of the 97 
SNP score is smaller and not statistically significant. While the difference in the 
probability of social income transfers for those with a high and low value of the 
instrument is not statistically significant for the 32 SNP score, it is statistically 
significant for the 97 SNP score.  
Lower rows in Appendix Table A3 shed some light on the criteria of validity.  
The 32 SNP score is associated with differences in two, and the 97 SNP score is 
associated with a difference in one, cognitive test score. There is also some evidence 
that obesity worsens academic test scores (Sabia, 2007; Averett and Stifel, 2010), 
although von Hinke Kessler Scholder et al. (2012) could not reject the null of no 
effect. The literature searches of Speliotes et al. (2010) and Locke et al. (2015) did not 
turn up evidence of a link between the BMI-related SNPs and intelligence. The 32 
SNP score is not associated with other covariates, but the 97 SNP score is associated 
                                                 
18 We have also estimated IV models that use both the genetic risk score and its square as instruments. 
The first-stage F-statistics in these models are lower (roughly 18), and the results are similar, so we 
continue to estimate models that simply use the level of the risk score as the IV. 
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with father’s income. This is a second piece of evidence that the 97 SNP score may be 
less valid than the 32 SNP score. (The first was the evidence that the 97 SNP score 
varies by subgroup, as seen in Appendix Table A1.)  
We also assessed the validity of our IV setting by examining potential 
heterogeneity between the variant-specific estimates. If all SNPs were valid 
instruments, their Mendelian randomization estimates should only vary by chance so 
that larger between-instrument heterogeneity would indicate a violation of IV 
assumptions, most likely due to pleiotropy (Greco et al., 2015). To visually illustrate 
the potential heterogeneity Figure A1 plots the genetic associations with log earnings 
(vertical axis) against genetic associations with the BMI (horizontal axis) for each of 
the 32 SNPs. (Figure A2 plots the same associations for the 97 SNPs.) Each point in 
Figure A1 stands for a genetic variant. The points should be compatible with a 
straight line through the origin under the null hypothesis of homogeneity and any 
point that substantially deviates from this horizontal line from the origin should be 
investigated for potential pleiotropy (Burgess et al., 2017, p. 35). Based on visual 
inspection the estimates do seem clustered along the horizontal at zero; the one 
vertical outlier is not significantly different from zero.  
In Figure A2, for the 97 SNP score, some estimates are statistically 
significantly different from zero. This could be the result of different SNPs having 
different Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE) by operating through different 
biological mechanisms; however, it is also consistent with pleiotropy. This is a third 
piece of evidence that the 97 SNP score may be less valid than the 32 SNP score. 
A formal statistical test of pleiotropy can be conducted using the Sargan’s 
over-identification test. To perform this test we estimated our main models using 
individual SNPs (both 32 and 97) as instruments for BMI. In all but one case, the 
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Sargan’s test supported the null hypothesis that all instruments yield the same 
Mendelian randomization estimate and thus provided support to the validity of our 
instrument. The exception is that when an indicator variable for social income 
transfers was used as the outcome variable, the null hypothesis was rejected at the 
10% level (p = 0.041) when 32 individual SNPs were used as instruments.  
4.3. IV estimates 
The coefficients from the IV models are presented in Columns 2 and 3 of 
Table I. The estimates based on using the 32 SNP GRS as an instrument (Column 2) 
indicate that a one-unit increase in BMI is associated with 6.9% lower wages19 and 
1.8 percentage point (2.1%) fewer years employed, both of which are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. A one-unit increase in BMI is also associated with a 3.0 
percentage point (3.7%) higher probability of receiving any social income transfers, 
which is also statistically significant at the 10% level.20 There is no statistically 
significant effect on the amount of social income transfers, conditional on receiving 
any.  
Expressed another way, the results imply that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in BMI (of 4.3 units) lowers wages by 29.7%, lowers years employed by 
9.0%, and raises the probability of receiving any social income transfers by 15.9%. 
Interestingly, when we use the broader risk score as an instrument in IV 
models (Column 3) we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect of BMI on any 
outcome. The IV coefficients on BMI in the regressions for employment and 
probability of social income transfers have the same sign as the earlier IV coefficients 
                                                 
19 Earnings and social income transfers have been log-transferred, so to interpret the coefficients on the 
GRS as a percent change, one must raise e to the power of the coefficient and then subtract one. 
20 If we estimate a specification for the whole sample setting zeros to 1 Euro and then using the 
logarithmic transformation of social income transfers as the outcome, using IV models we find that 
higher BMI leads to a significant overall increase in transfers (Appendix Table A4). 
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based on the 32 SNP score, but both are smaller and neither is statistically significant. 
In the Discussion, we consider explanations for the differences in results between the 
32 SNP score and the 97 SNP score.  
Reduced-Form Estimates 
Table II presents results of reduced-form models that regress outcomes on the 
instrument (BMI genetic risk score) directly, controlling for the same set of regressors 
as earlier. The results are consistent with those of the IV models. Raising the 32 SNP 
genetic risk score by one (meaning that an individual has one additional allele that 
raises their risk of high BMI) is associated with 1.2% lower earnings, 0.3 percentage 
points (0.3%) fewer years of employment, and a 0.5 percentage point (0.6%) higher 
probability of receiving any social income transfers, all of which are statistically 
significant at the 5% level (Column 1 of Table II).   
Again, the choice of GRS makes a difference in the results. Column 2 of Table 
II shows that the reduced-form estimates for the 97 SNP score are typically not 
statistically significant. The exception is that an additional risky allele is associated 
with a 8.7 percentage point (10.6%) increase in the probability of receiving any social 
income transfers.21 
5. CONCLUSION 
Much of the evidence about causal effects of obesity is based on IV models in 
which the instrument for respondent weight is the weight of a biological relative. This 
paper contributes to the literature by using a novel instrument: genetic risk score for 
obesity based on many SNPs that are robustly associated with high BMI.  
                                                 
21 We also regressed the 97 SNP score on the 32 SNP score and used the residual as a predictor in the 
reduced-form model along with 32 SNP GRS. In earnings equation, there was a significant difference 
between 32 SNP GRS and residual coefficients. This suggests that the newly-added SNPs in the larger 
score may have a different relationship to earnings than the SNPs in the narrower score. This might 
indicate that the newly added SNPs are less exogenous or less powerful.   
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Specifically, we use two such genetic risk scores, and find evidence that IV model 
estimates are sensitive to which risk score is used.  
The estimates of the IV models that use the genetic risk score based on 32 
SNPs confirm those of the previous literature that used a different instrument (the 
weight of a biological relative): weight lowers wages and the probability of 
employment. Specifically, our IV estimates indicate that an additional unit of BMI 
lowers wages by 6.9% and reduces the share of years employed by 2.1%. We also 
examine the novel outcome of social income transfers and find that an additional unit 
of BMI increases the probability of receiving social income transfers by 3.7%. This 
represents potential negative externalities of obesity – social costs of obesity paid by 
non-obese individuals – and thus an economic rationale for government intervention 
to prevent and reduce obesity. It is well-established that obesity imposes negative 
externalities through higher health care costs (e.g. Cawley and Meyerhoefer, 2012) 
but this paper offers the first evidence that there may also be negative externalities 
through social income transfers.  
Reduced form models that regress outcomes directly on the genetic risk score 
based on 32 SNPs are also consistent with the hypothesis that additional weight 
worsens labor market outcomes; raising the genetic risk score by one (meaning that an 
individual has one additional allele that raises their risk of weight gain) is associated 
with 1.2% lower earnings, 0.3% fewer years employed, and a 0.6% higher probability 
of receiving social income transfers.   
When we use a GRS based on 97 SNPs as the instrument in the IV model, 
however, the estimates are quite different. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect of BMI on labor market outcomes. The 97 SNP score is typically not 
statistically significant in reduced-form models either; the exception is that an 
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additional risky allele is associated with a 10.6% increase in the probability of 
receiving any social income transfers.  
There are several possible explanations for the sensitivity of the results to the 
genetic risk score used. First, the 97 SNP score is available for a slightly smaller 
sample than the 32 SNP score, so some statistical power is lost. This does not appear 
to be a critical factor, because when we re-estimate the IV model using the 32 SNP 
score but for the smaller sample with a valid 97 SNP score, the IV results are similar 
to those for the full sample. Second, it is possible that the weighting of the 97 SNP 
score makes a difference. To explore this we re-estimated the IV models using a 
weighted 32 SNP score, and we find that it does raise the standard errors to the point 
that the results are not statistically significant. Thus, the weights may be playing some 
role in the difference in results. The weights are based on each SNP’s predictive 
power in a large international sample, of which the YFS constitutes less than 1%; as a 
result, the weights may not be optimal or appropriate for the YFS sample. A third 
reason why the results differ for the 97 SNP and 32 SNP scores is that the additional 
SNPs in the broader score may operate through different biological mechanisms and 
thus may have different Local Average Treatment Effects. A fourth explanation for 
the difference in results between the two risk scores is that the larger 97 SNP score 
may face a greater risk of bias because it includes SNPs less highly correlated with 
BMI but potentially correlated with other things that could affect labor market 
outcomes. We find two pieces of evidence that the 97 SNP score may not be as valid 
as the 32 SNP score: 1) the 97 SNP score but not the 32 SNP score varies by sex, age, 
marital status (Appendix Table A1), as well as father’s income (Appendix Table A1 
and Appendix Table A3); and 2) the 97 SNP score but not the 32 SNP score exhibits 
significant heterogeneity between variant-specific estimates, which could be due to 
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different SNPs having different LATEs through different biological mechanisms but 
may be due to pleiotropy (Appendix Figures A1 and A2). Because of this evidence 
casting some doubt on the validity of the 97 SNP score, the 32 SNP score is the 
preferred instrument in this study.  
In general, it is noteworthy that the IV results are sensitive to the choice of 
genetic instrument. Future studies in this area may wish to test the robustness of their 
results to the use of alternate genetic risk scores, and to explore reasons for any 
differences that are found.   
A strength of the paper is that the key variables are free of reporting error; i.e. 
weight and height are measured and information on employment, earnings, and social 
income transfers are taken from administrative records. This implies that the estimates 
are relatively free of the problems of bias and inflated standard errors that result from 
error in the dependent and independent variables (Bound et al., 2001; Cawley et al., 
2015; Courtemanche et al., 2015).  
We acknowledge the limitations of this paper. The sample is relatively small 
(N=2,062), providing little statistical power to estimate models separately by gender 
or other subgroups. Despite being rich in other ways, the data do not allow us to 
further investigate the mechanisms by which BMI affects labor market outcomes. It is 
always important to stress when using the method of IV that important assumptions 
regarding the validity of the instruments are not testable. Although the SNPs that are 
used in the genetic risk score for BMI were generally not found to be linked to non-
obesity-related outcomes, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of no effect is not 
the same as proving the null.  It is also possible that the reason the SNPs are linked to 
obesity-related illness is because of some direct effect that does not operate through a 
high BMI. The exact function and mechanisms of these SNPs are not known with 
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certainty. Although the 32 SNP GRS was used as an example of a powerful and likely 
valid application of genes as IVs (von Hinke et al., 2016), that study also pointed out 
the need for caution regarding instrument validity.  
When considering the generalizability of these results, it should be noted that 
the Local Average Treatment Effect that we measure concerns the impact of genetic 
variation in weight; it is possible that variation in weight due to other sources could 
have a different impact on labor market outcomes. Moreover, our IVs measure only 
the genetic variation due to the specific SNPs included in the risk scores. Those in the 
32 SNP score affect weight through regulators of appetite or energy balance, or 
insulin secretion or response (Speliotes et al., 2010). It is possible that genetic 
variation in weight that operates through other mechanisms (e.g. resting metabolic 
rate, or propensity to add muscle mass) could exhibit a different relationship with 
labor market outcomes.  
Our data are from Finland, a relatively small nation where the wage 
distribution is narrower than in the Anglo-Saxon countries, which may raise some 
issues of generalizability, but it is a highly economically developed country that is a 
member of the European Union and shares many labor market characteristics with the 
rest of Western Europe. The prevalence of obesity in Finland is 20.9% among adult 
men and 22.3% among adult women (Ng et al., 2014), which is similar to that of 
other Western European countries. Despite these limitations, the strengths of the data, 
such as genetic information, measured weight and height, and comprehensive 
administrative data on wages, employment, and social income transfers that are 
measured without reporting error, make it well-suited to investigate this research 
question. 
 
26 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
The Young Finns Study has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland: 
grants 286284, 134309 (Eye), 126925, 121584, 124282, 129378 (Salve), 117787 
(Gendi), and 41071 (Skidi); the Social Insurance Institution of Finland; Competitive 
State Research Financing of the Expert Responsibility area of Kuopio, Tampere and 
Turku University Hospitals (grant X51001); Juho Vainio Foundation; Paavo Nurmi 
Foundation; Finnish Foundation for Cardiovascular Research ; Finnish Cultural 
Foundation; Tampere Tuberculosis Foundation; Emil Aaltonen Foundation; Yrjö 
Jahnsson Foundation; Signe and Ane Gyllenberg Foundation; Diabetes Research 
Foundation of Finnish Diabetes Association; and EU Horizon 2020 (grant 755320 for 
TAXINOMISIS). The use of linked data is supported by the Palkansaaja Foundation. 
Jutta Viinikainen and Jaakko Pehkonen acknowledge the financial support from 
theYrjö Jahnsson foundation (grants 6646 and 6664). Petri Böckerman thanks the 
Strategic Research Council funding for the project Work, Inequality and Public Policy 
(293120). John Cawley thanks the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation for an 
Investigator Award in Health Policy Research. We thank Barton Willage for research 
assistance. Finally, we also thank two anonymous reviewers, the seminar participants 
at the EALE, Oulu Business School and the VATT seminar and Jani-Petri Laamanen 
for helpful comments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Averett SL. 2011. Labor market consequences: Employment, wages, disability, and 
absenteeism. In The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Obesity, 
Cawley J (ed). Oxford University Press: New York, pp. 531–552.  
Averett SL, Stifel DC. 2010. Race and gender differences in the cognitive effects of 
childhood overweight. Applied Economics Letters 17: 1673–1679. 
Barsh GS, Farooqi IS, O’Rahilly S. 2000. Genetics of body-weight regulation. Nature 
404: 644–651. 
Bound J, Brown C, Mathiowetz N. 2001. Measurement error in survey data. In 
Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 5, Leamer E, Heckman J (eds). North 
Holland: Amsterdam, pp. 3705–3843. 
Bowden J, Davey Smith G, Burgess S. 2015. Mendelian randomization with invalid 
instruments: Effect estimation and bias detection through Egger 
regression. International Journal of Epidemiology 44: 512–525. 
Brunello G, d’Hombres B. 2007. Does body weight affect wages? Evidence from 
Europe. Economics and Human Biology 5: 1–19. 
Burgess S, Bowden J, Fall T, Ingelsson E, Thompson SG 2017. Sensitivity analyses 
for robust causal inference from Mendelian randomization analyses with 
multiple genetic variants. Epidemiology 28: 30–42. 
Cawley J. 2004. The impact of obesity on wages. Journal of Human Resources 39: 
451–474. 
Cawley J. 2015. An economy of scales: A selective review of obesity’s economic 
causes, consequences, and solutions. Journal of Health Economics 43: 244–
268. 
Cawley J, Han E, Norton E. 2011. The validity of genes related to neurotransmitters 
as instrumental variables. Health Economics 20: 884–888. 
Cawley J, Maclean JC, Hammer M, Wintfeld N. 2015. Reporting error in weight and 
its implications for bias in economic models. Economics and Human Biology 
19: 27–44. 
Cawley J, Meyerhoefer C. 2012. The medical care costs of obesity: An instrumental 
variables approach. Journal of Health Economics 31: 219–230. 
Conley D. 2016. Socio-genomic research using genome-wide molecular data. Annual 
Review of Sociology 42: 275–299. 
Courtemanche C, Pinkston JC, Stewart J. 2015. Adjusting body mass for 
measurement error with invalid validation data. Economics and Human 
Biology 19: 275–293. 
Dahl M, DeLeire T, Schwabish JA. 2011. Estimates of year-to-year volatility in 
earnings and in household incomes from administrative, survey, and matched 
data. Journal of Human Resources 46: 750–774. 
Davey Smith G. 2011. Random allocation in observational data: How small but robust 
effects could facilitate hypothesis-free causal inference. Epidemiology 22: 
460–463.  
Davey Smith G, Paternoster L, Relton C. 2017. When will Mendelian randomization 
become relevant for clinical practice and public Health? Journal of the 
American Medical Association 317: 589–591. 
De Luca CR, Wood SJ, Anderson V, Buchanan J-A, Proffitt TM, Mahony K, Pantelis 
C. 2003. Normative data from the CANTAB. I: Development of executive 
function over the lifespan. Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology 25: 242–254. 
28 
 
GBD 2015 Obesity Collaborators. 2017. Health effects of overweight and obesity in 
195 countries over 25 years. New England Journal of Medicine 377: 13–27.  
Greco FD, Minelli C, Sheehan NA, Thompson JR. 2015. Detecting pleiotropy in 
Mendelian randomisation studies with summary data and a continuous 
outcome. Statistics in Medicine 34: 2926–2940. 
Haycock PC, Burgess S, Wade KH, Bowden J, Relton C, Davey Smith G. 2016. Best 
(but oft-forgotten) practices: The design, analysis, and interpretation of 
Mendelian randomization studies. The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 
103: 965–978. 
Hu F. 2008. Obesity Epidemiology. Oxford University Press: New York. 
International Consortium for Blood Pressure Genome-Wide Association Studies. 
2011. Genetic variants in novel pathways influence blood pressure and 
cardiovascular disease risk. Nature 478: 103–109. 
Johansson E, Böckerman P, Kiiskinen U, Heliövaara M. 2009. Obesity and labour 
market success in Finland: The difference between having a high BMI and 
being fat. Economics and Human Biology 7: 36–45. 
Kaplowitz PB. 2008. Link between body fat and the timing of puberty. Pediatrics 121 
(Supplement 3): S208–S217. 
Kline B, Tobias JL. 2008. The wages of BMI: Bayesian analysis of a skewed 
treatment–response model with nonparametric endogeneity. Journal of 
Applied Econometrics 23: 767–793. 
Komlos J, Smith PK, Bogin B. 2004. Obesity and the rate of time preference: Is there 
a connection? Journal of Biosocial Science 36: 209–219. 
Lindeboom M, Lundborg P, van der Klaauw B. 2010. Assessing the impact of obesity 
on labor market outcomes. Economics and Human Biology 8: 309–319. 
Locke AE, Kahali B, Berndt SI et al. 2015. Genetic studies of body mass index yield 
new insights for obesity biology. Nature 518: 197–206. 
McClellan M, McNeil BJ, Newhouse JP. 1994. Does more intensive treatment of 
acute myocardial infarction in the elderly reduce mortality? Analysis using 
instrumental variables. Journal of the American Medical Association 272: 
859–866. 
Mincer JA. 1974. Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. National Bureau of 
Economic Research: New York. 
Ng M, Fleming T, Robinson M et al. 2014. Global, regional, and national prevalence 
of overweight and obesity in children and adults during 1980–2013: A 
systematic analysis for the global burden of disease study 2013. The Lancet 
384: 766–781. 
Norton EC, Han E. 2008. Genetic information, obesity and labor market outcomes. 
Health Economics 17: 1089–1104. 
Palmer TM, Lawlor DA, Harbord RM, Sheehan NA, Tobias JH, Timpson NJ, Davey 
Smith G, Sterne JAC. 2012. Using multiple genetic variants as instrumental 
variables for modifiable risk factors. Statistical Methods in Medical Research 
21: 223–242. 
Pietiläinen KH, Kaprio J, Rissanen A, Winter T, Rimpelä A, Viken RJ, Rose RJ. 
1999. Distribution and heritability of BMI in Finnish adolescents aged 16 y 
and 17 y: A study of 4884 twins and 2509 singletons. International Journal of 
Obesity 23: 107–115. 
Puhl RM. 2011. Bias, stigma, and discrimination. In The Oxford Handbook of the 
Social Science of Obesity, Cawley J (ed). Oxford University Press: New York, 
pp. 553–571. 
29 
 
Raitakari OT, Juonala M, Rönnemaa T et al. 2008. Cohort profile: The cardiovascular 
risk in Young Finns Study. International Journal of Epidemiology 37: 1220–
1226. 
Robbins TW, James M, Owen AM, Sahakian, BJ, McInnes L, Rabbitt P. 1994. 
Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB): A factor 
analytic study of a large sample of normal elderly volunteers. Dementia 5: 
266–281. 
Rooth D-O. 2009. Obesity, attractiveness, and differential treatment in hiring: A field 
experiment. Journal of Human Resources 44: 710–735. 
Sabia JJ. 2007. The effect of body weight on adolescent academic performance. 
Southern Economic Journal 73: 871–900. 
Sarlio-Lähteenkorva S, Silventoinen K, Lahelma E. 2004. Relative weight and 
income at different levels of socioeconomic status. American Journal of 
Public Health 94: 468–472. 
Schmeiser MD. 2009. Expanding wallets and waistlines: The impact of family income 
on the BMI of women and men eligible for the earned income tax credit. 
Health Economics 18: 1277–1294.  
Speliotes EK, Willer CJ, Berndt SI et al. 2010. Association analyses of 249,796 
individuals reveal 18 new loci associated with body mass index. Nature 
Genetics 42: 937–948. 
Staiger D, Stock JH. 1997. Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. 
Econometrica 65: 447–486. 
Teslovich TM, Musunuru K, Smith AV et al. 2010. Biological, clinical and 
population relevance of 95 loci for blood lipids. Nature 466: 707–713. 
Tyrrell J, Jones SE, Beaumont R et al. 2016. Height, body mass index, and 
socioeconomic status: Mendelian randomisation study in UK Biobank. British 
Medical Journal 352: i582. 
von Hinke Kessler Scholder S, Davey Smith G, Lawlor DA, Propper C, Windmeijer 
F. 2012. The effect of fat mass on educational attainment: Examining the 
sensitivity to different identification strategies. Economics and Human 
Biology 10: 405–418. 
von Hinke S, Davey Smith G, Lawlor DA, Propper C, Windmeijer F. 2016. Genetic 
markers as instrumental variables. Journal of Health Economics 45: 131–148. 
Wang Y. 2002. Is obesity associated with early sexual maturation? A comparison of 
the association in American boys versus girls. Pediatrics 110: 903–910. 
 
 
  
30 
 
Table I. The effect of BMI on average labor market outcomes, 2001-2012 
 
Panel A: Log of Average Earnings, 2001-
2012 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
IV – 32 SNP 
score 
(3)  
IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.071** 
(0.036) 
0.010 
(0.027) 
    
F-statistics … 36.53 58.92 
Mean outcome 9.863 9.863 9.866 
N 2038 2038 1886 
    
Panel B: Share of Years Employed, 2001-
2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP 
score 
IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.018** 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
    
F-statistics .. 39.90 62.73 
Mean outcome 0.857 0.857 0.859 
N   2062   2062 1909 
    
Panel C: Indicator for Social Income 
Transfers,  
2001-2012 (Extensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP 
score 
IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.030* 
(0.016) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
    
F-statistics .. 36.53 58.92 
Mean outcome 0.821 0.821 0.819 
N 2038 2038 1886 
    
Panel D: Log of Average Social Income 
Transfers, 2001-2012 (Intensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP 
score 
IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.005 
(0.009) 
0.061 
(0.068) 
-0.020 
(0.044) 
    
F-statistics .. 23.49 51.97 
Mean outcome 6.836 6.836 6.831 
N 1673 1673 1545 
 
Notes: Earnings are measured as the log of average earnings over the period 2001-2012. Employment is 
measured as the average share of employment years over the period 2001-2012. Indicator for social 
income transfers equals one for those who have received social security transfers at least once during 
2001-2012. Social income transfers are measured as the log of average transfers over the period 2001-
2012, conditional on obtaining a positive amount of transfers. The mean values for the dependent 
variables are reported. BMI is measured in 2001. All models include controls for the birth month and 
birth year effects. Gender and parental education (1980) are also controlled for in all models. The 
instrument used in the IV models is the BMI risk score, based on genetic markers. Angrist-Pischke 
multivariate F-tests of excluded instrument are reported for the IV models. Heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; 
*** at the 0.01 level.   
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Table II. Reduced form IV estimates 
 
 (1) 
32 SNP score 
(2) 
97 SNP score 
Panel A: Log of Average Earnings, 
2001-2012 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.046 
(0.122) 
Mean outcome 9.863 9.866 
N 2038 1886 
   
 32 SNP score 97 SNP score 
Panel B: Share of Years Employed, 
2001-2012 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
-0.023 
(0.035) 
Mean outcome 0.857 0.859 
N    2062 1909 
   
 32 SNP score 97 SNP score 
Panel C: Indicator for Social 
Income Transfers,  
2001-2012 (Extensive margin) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.087* 
(0.053) 
Mean outcome 0.821 0.819 
N 2038 1886 
   
 32 SNP score 97 SNP score 
Panel D: Log of Average Social 
Income Transfers, 2001-2012 
(Intensive margin) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
-0.095 
(0.211) 
Mean outcome 6.836 6.831 
N 1673 1545 
 
Notes: Earnings are measured as the log of average earnings over the period 2001-2012. Employment is 
measured as the average share of employment years over the period 2001-2012. Indicator for social 
income transfers equals one for those who have received social security transfers at least once during 
2001-2012. Social income transfers are measured as the log of average transfers over the period 2001-
2012, conditional on obtaining a positive amount of transfers. The mean values for the dependent 
variables are reported. All models include controls for the birth month and birth year effects. Gender and 
parental education (1980) are also controlled for in all models. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 
0.01 level. 
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ONLINE SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1:  
Tests of cognitive performance  
 
In the latest follow-up of YFS (2011-12), cognitive function was assessed with 
commercially available Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery 
(CANTAB®). The CANTAB® is a computerized, predominantly non-linguistic and 
culturally neutral test performed using a validated touch-screen computer system. The 
full test battery includes 25 individual tests from which, five age sensitive tests 
(Robbins et al. 1994; De Luca et al. 2003) were selected for YFS. The tests measured 
several cognitive domains: 1) short term memory, 2) spatial working memory, 3) 
problem solving, 4) reaction time, 5) attention, 6) rapid visual processing, 7) visual 
memory, 8) episodic memory, and 9) visuospatial learning.  
During cognitive testing the participants first conducted a motor screening test 
(MOT) measuring psychomotor speed and accuracy. In this study, the MOT test was 
considered as a training procedure in which the participants were introduced to the 
equipment used in the testing, and as a screening tool to point out any difficulties in 
vision, movement, comprehension or ability to follow simple instructions. Paired 
associates learning (PAL) test was used to assess visual and episodic memory as well 
as visuospatial associative learning containing aspects of both delayed response 
procedure and conditional learning. Spatial working memory (SWM) test was used to 
measure ability to retain spatial information and to manipulate items stored in the 
working memory, problem solving as well as the ability to conduct a self-organized 
search strategy. Reaction time (RTI) test assessed speed of response and movement 
on tasks where the stimulus was either predictable (simple location task) or 
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unpredictable (five-choice location task). Rapid visual information (RVP) test was 
used to assess visual processing, recognition and sustained attention.  
 Each of the CANTAB® tests produced several variables. Therefore, principal 
component analysis was conducted to reduce the number of variables and to identify 
components accounting for the majority of the variation within the cognition dataset. 
First, principal component analysis was conducted for the complete cognitive data 
and the resulting first component was considered as an indicator for overall cognitive 
performance. Second, principal component analyses were performed separately for all 
individual tests (MOT, PAL, SWM, RTI, RVP). The first components resulting from 
these analyses were considered to represent cognitive performance related to the 
particular domain. After creating the overall and testwise principal components their 
distributions were analyzed. The component for MOT test was excluded from further 
analyses because it did not discriminate the subjects indicating a ceiling effect. All 
other components were normalized based on the rank order normalization procedure 
resulting in five separate variables, each with mean value of 0 and standard deviation 
of 1. 
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Appendix 2: Additional tables and figures  
 
Appendix Table A1: An indirect test of independence assumption:  
regressing the covariates on the BMI 32 SNP GRS 
 
            (1) 
OLS 
32 SNP GRS 
(2) 
32 independent 
variants 
p-value of F-
statistics; 
instrument SNPs 
jointly equal to 
zero 
(3) 
OLS  
97 SNP GRS 
(4) 
97 independent 
variants 
p-value of F-
statistics; 
instrument 
SNPs jointly 
equal to zero 
Female -0.005 
(0.003) 
0.529 -0.015 
(0.071) 
0.002 
Age in 2001 -0.004 
(0.033) 
0.937 -0.739 
(0.707) 
0.012 
Married in 2001 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.257 -0.100 
(0.071) 
0.080 
Family income 
(1980),  
mother (euros) 
-26.083 
(22.346) 
0.902 -511.666 
(489.019) 
0.144 
Family income 
(1980),  
father (euros) 
-68.203* 
(35.352) 
0.270 -912.339 
(868.100) 
0.003 
University education, 
mother 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.372 0.037 
(0.037) 
0.870 
University education,  
father 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.352 0.005 
(0.046) 
0.164 
 
Notes: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.     
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Appendix Table A2: 
Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean (SD) N 
   
Average annual earnings (2001-2012), euros  24527.93 (15042.27) 2038 
Share of years employed (2001-2012)  0.857 (0.245) 2062 
Received social income transfers at any point (2001-
2012) (extensive margin) 
0.821 (0.384) 2038 
Average annual social income transfers (2001-2012), 
euros (intensive margin) 
2005.13 (2156.62) 1673 
   
Earnings (2001), euros  18915.49 (14382.31) 2038 
Earnings (2007), euros 26399.55 (19239.1) 1940 
Earnings (2011), euros  29528.85 (19952.31) 1729 
Indicator for being employed (2001) 0.807 (0.395) 2062 
Indicator for being employed (2007) 0.885 (0.320) 1957 
Indicator for being employed (2011)  0.906 (0.291) 1742 
Indicator for social income transfers (2001) (extensive 
margin) 
0.367 (0.482) 2038 
Indicator for social income transfers (2007) (extensive 
margin) 
0.334 (0.472) 1940 
Indicator for social income transfers (2011) (extensive 
margin) 
0.291 (0.454) 1729 
Social income transfers (2001), euros (intensive 
margin) 
4195.33 (3806.08) 748 
Social income transfers (2007), euros (intensive 
margin) 
4770.23 (4567.03) 647 
Social income transfers (2011), euros (intensive 
margin) 
5182.99 (5097.73) 503 
   
BMI (2001) 25.052 (4.290) 2038 
BMI (2007) 25.864 (4.432) 1940 
BMI (2011) 26.338 (4.621) 1729 
BMI risk score based on 32 SNPs (unweighted) 29.144 (3.358) 2038 
BMI risk score based on 97 SNPs (weighted) 2.316 (0.161) 1886 
BMI>=30 (2001) 0.124 (0.329) 2038 
Weight (2001) 74.686 (15.854) 2038 
   
University education (1980), mother 0.072 (0.258) 2038 
University education (1980), father 0.102 (0.303) 2038 
Income (1980), mother (euros)  4616.65 (3503.96) 2023 
Income (1980), father (euros)  8739.78 (5775.44) 1931 
   
Married (2001) 0.445 (0.497) 2038 
   
Overall cognitive performance (2011-2012) 0.010 (0.996) 1334 
Visual and episodic memory and visuospatial 
associative learning 
0.013 (0.989) 1334 
Reaction time  0.021 (0.996) 1334 
Rapid visual information processing 0.042 (0.985) 1334 
Spatial working memory  0.005 (0.974) 1334 
   
Genetic risk score for blood pressure 30.449 (3.215) 2001 
Genetic risk score for total cholesterol  27.462 (3.089) 2001 
Genetic risk score for triglycerides 26.128 (2.875) 2001 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are reported for the samples that are used in the estimations.  
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Appendix Table A3: 
Comparison of observables by value of instrument 
 
 Difference 
(32 SNP GRS) 
t-statistics 
(32 SNP GRS) 
Difference 
(97 SNP GRS) 
t-statistics 
(97 SNP GRS) 
     
     
Earnings,  
2001-2012 (euros) 
1493.685 2.241** -679.512 -0.981 
Share of years employed, 
2001-2012 
0.017 1.575 -0.003 -0.227 
Indicator for social income 
transfers, 2001-2012 
(extensive margin) 
-0.024 -1.431 -0.037 -2.105** 
Social income transfers, 
2001-2012 (euros) 
(intensive margin) 
-103.129 -0.977 -2.105 -0.069 
     
BMI (2001) -0.920 -4.840*** -0.958 -4.864*** 
     
Married (2001) 
 
0.001 0.029 0.017 0.758 
     
Cognitive performance 
(2011-2012) 
    
Visual and episodic memory 
and visuospatial associative 
learning 
0.061 1.114 0.038 0.664 
Reaction time  
 
-0.028 -0.517 0.059 1.042 
Rapid visual information 
processing 
0.187 3.481***   0.097 1.728* 
Spatial working memory  0.124 2.321** 0.055 0.984 
     
Family background 
(1980) 
    
Income, mother 
(euros) 
247.164 1.591 143.705 0.893 
Income, father 
(euros)  
135.016 0.511 459.600 1.688* 
University education, 
mother 
-0.001 -0.112 -0.003 -0.270 
University education, father -0.004 -0.323 0.008 0.544 
 
Notes: The difference is calculated by subtracting variable’s mean value in the low GRS group from the mean 
value in the high GRS group. Low (high) GRS group consists of individuals whose GRS is below (above) 
the average value of the risk score.     
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Appendix Table A4. The effect of BMI on social income transfers 
 
Log of Average Social Income Transfers, 
2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP 
score 
IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.012 
(0.015) 
0.251** 
(0.120) 
0.111 
(0.088) 
    
F-statistics .. 36.53 58.92 
Mean outcome 5.603 5.603 5.587 
N 2038 2038 1886 
 
Notes: Social income transfers are measured as the log of average transfers over the period 2001-2012 
for the whole sample, setting zeros to 1 Euro. The mean value for the dependent variable is reported. 
BMI is measured in 2001. All models include controls for the birth month and birth year effects. Gender 
and parental education (1980) are also controlled for in all models. The instrument used in the IV models 
is the BMI risk score, based on genetic markers. Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-tests of excluded 
instrument are reported for the IV models. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Figure A1. Scatter plot of genetic association with log earnings against genetic 
associations with BMI (32 SNP score) 
 
 
Notes: Lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Figure A2. Scatter plot of genetic association with log earnings against genetic 
associations with BMI (97 SNP score) 
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Appendix 3: 
Extensions 
 
We estimate several additional models to assess the robustness of the results. 
Specifically, we estimate models separately by wave, control for genetic 
predisposition to obesity-related illness, control for cognitive performance, estimate 
models separately by sex, and estimate models for alternate measures of fatness other 
than BMI.  
In brief, we find that when the sample size is reduced by estimating models 
separately by wave (instead of pooling all years), separately by sex (instead of 
pooling men and women), or by controlling for cognitive performance that is 
available for only a subset of the sample, the point estimates do not change 
significantly but the standard errors rise sufficiently that often the coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero.  
We also find that the overall result that weight worsens labor market outcomes 
is robust to controlling for the genetic risk score for obesity-related illnesses such as 
high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and high triglycerides (section B); this is useful 
as it suggests that the mechanisms by which BMI affects labor market outcomes may 
not be those specific health conditions. We also find that the results are robust to 
using an indicator variable for obesity or weight in kg instead of BMI as the measure 
of fatness (section E).    
A. EXTENSION 1: ESTIMATE MODELS SEPARATELY BY WAVE 
In the main results we examine average labor market outcomes over the period 
2001-2012 in order to minimize the influence of idiosyncratic variation that would 
diminish the precision of the estimates in our relatively small sample (cf. Dahl et al., 
2011). As an extension we estimate models for each wave of the YFS separately 
(2001, 2007, 2011), regressing the economic outcome for that year on BMI from that 
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year and other characteristics in that year (the exception is parental education, which 
is recorded on a single year); these results are presented in Table A7.   
With the smaller samples and reduced power that comes from examining each 
wave separately, only two of the wave-specific estimates is statistically significant. 
The 32 SNP IV model indicates that a one-unit increase in BMI lowers earnings by 
19.2% in 2001, compared to 7.1% over 2001-2012. The results are significant at a 
10% and 5% level, respectively. The estimated effect of BMI on employment is very 
similar for the individual year 2001 (-2.2%) and the average of the period 2001-2012 
(-1.8%), but the former is not statistically significant whereas the latter is. The second 
statistically significant result is that in year 2001 one-unit increase in BMI is 
associated with 13.9% higher social income transfers (conditional on receiving any) 
in the 97 SNP GRS IV model.    
Although the point estimates in Table A7 are not significantly different from 
those in Table I, some are of the opposite sign. There are several possible 
explanations for the difference in point estimates. For example, it could be the result 
of idiosyncratic variation in labor market outcomes in a single year. Measurement 
error in yearly outcomes leads to attenuation bias. We strongly prefer the use of long-
term measures of outcomes due to the fact that they dampen e.g. the effects of 
business cycle fluctuations on outcomes in a small open economy such as Finland. 
Conversely, contemporaneous weight (used in the wave-specific regressions) may be 
more relevant than one’s historic weight to outcomes in that year.  
B. EXTENSION 2: CONTROL FOR GENETIC PREDISPOSITION TO OBESITY-
RELATED ILLNESSES 
 A general concern about using genetic markers as IVs is that genes may affect 
multiple things (pleiotropy). As an extension we control for the genetic risk score for 
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blood pressure, total cholesterol, and triglycerides (Teslovich et al., 2010; 
International Consortium for Blood Pressure Genome-Wide Association Studies, 
2011). If obesity affects labor market outcomes primarily because our genetic risk 
score (GRS) also predicts obesity-related illnesses, we would expect that directly 
controlling for the risk scores for those obesity-related illness to result in a reduction 
in the point estimate of the IV estimate for BMI. However, the genetic risk scores for 
other diseases are not statistically significantly correlated with genetic risk score for 
BMI (Appendix Table A8); for this reason it is not surprising that we find that 
controlling for genetic risk scores for other diseases has little impact on the point 
estimate of the IV coefficient on BMI. For example, the IV models based on 32 SNP 
GRS indicate that a one-unit increase in BMI reduces log average wages by 6.9% 
when we do not control for the other risk scores (Table I), and by 7.3% when we do 
(Table A9). A one-unit increase in BMI reduces years spent employed by 1.8% when 
we do not control for the other genetic risk scores (Table I), and by 1.7% when we do 
(Table A9). Controlling for other genetic risk scores likewise has only a small impact 
on the IV coefficient on BMI in the regressions for whether one received social 
income transfers. This suggests that the impact of BMI on labor market outcomes 
may not be operating through these three specific conditions.  
C. EXTENSION 3: CONTROL FOR COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE  
 In the YFS, measures of cognitive performance are available for only a subset 
of the sample (1,334 out of 2,038). In the main results of this paper, we exclude 
cognitive performance from the set of regressors in order to avoid losing observations 
and thus statistical power and because cognitive performance may be affected by 
obesity (e.g. Sabia, 2007; Averett and Stifel, 2010). However, as an extension we 
estimate models in which we control for the five measures of cognitive performance: 
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1) overall cognitive performance 2) visual and episodic memory and visuospatial 
associative learning; 3) reaction time; 4) rapid visual information processing; and 5) 
spatial working memory. The results are presented in Appendix Table A10.   
 In each case, the point estimate of the coefficient on BMI is smaller in 
absolute magnitude and the coefficient is no longer statistically significant. However, 
the difference in point estimates is not statistically significant, which suggests that the 
lack of statistical significance in these models may be due to reduced sample size. 
D. EXTENSION 4: ESTIMATE MODELS SEPARATELY BY SEX  
Because of the relatively small sample size of the YFS, the main models in 
this paper were estimated for men and women pooled. However, previous studies of 
weight and labor market outcomes often found differences by sex; for example, there 
tends to be a greater wage penalty for excess weight among women than men in the 
U.S. (Cawley, 2004) and also in Finland (Sarlio-Lähteenkorva et al., 2004; Johansson 
et al., 2009). For this reason, as an extension we estimate models separately for men 
and women; see Appendix Tables A11 (men) and A12 (women). Interestingly, the 32 
SNP genetic risk score is a more powerful instrument for men (F of 16-30) than 
women (F of 8-13). As found in earlier studies of weight and wages, the point 
estimate of the IV coefficient on BMI is larger for women than men; specifically, 
based on 32 SNP IV model a one-unit increase in BMI is associated with 11.0% lower 
wages for women (Appendix Table A12) compared to 4.6% lower wages for men 
(Appendix Table A11). Neither is statistically significant, however, presumably 
because of the smaller sample sizes (1,109 women and 929 men). Results based on 92 
SNPs indicate that one-unit increase in BMI is related with 2.2 % higher wages for 
men and 0.5% lower wages for women but the results are not statistically significant.  
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The point estimates of the 32 SNP IV coefficient on BMI in the employment 
regressions are similar for women and men; a one-unit increase in BMI lowers the 
time spent working by 2.1% for women and 1.7% for men; neither is statistically 
significant.  The respective numbers for 97 SNP IV model are 0.7% and 0.4%. 
The impact of BMI on social welfare transfers is positive, large, and 
statistically significant for men; a one-unit increase in BMI increases the amount of 
social welfare transfers by 19.2%. For women the estimate is not statistically 
significant.  
E. EXTENSION 5: ALTERNATE MEASURES OF FATNESS: OBESITY, KG 
 As an extension, we estimate models for additional measures of fatness: an 
indicator variable for obesity (BMI>=30), and weight in kilograms. Using an 
indicator variable for BMI>=30 allows us to focus on the effect of a BMI in the 
unhealthy range where the negative health effects should be more pronounced. A 
limitation of this approach is that there is less variation in the instrumented variable 
and the genetic risk score for BMI is constructed for the whole range of BMI.  
Results are presented in Appendix Tables A13 (obesity) and A14 (weight in 
kg). Column 1 in each table presents results from OLS models. Interestingly, although 
the OLS coefficients on BMI were not statistically significant (in Table I), the OLS 
coefficients on obesity are statistically significant in earnings and employment 
equations. Obesity is associated with 13.3% lower wages and 3.2% fewer years 
employed (Appendix Table A13). 
We use BMI genetic risk score as an instrument for the indicator for obesity 
and for weight in kg (the F-statistics range from 14 to 28 for 32 SNP GRS and from 
27 to 44 for 97 SNP GRS). Appendix Table A13 presents IV results for the indicator 
for obesity. Results are generally consistent with the IV models for BMI: obesity 
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reduces earnings (although, by an implausibly large amount – 111.1%) and reduces 
the time spent employed by 28.6%. The IV estimates also indicate that obesity raises 
the probability of receiving social income transfers by 46.4 percentage points.  The 97 
SNP IV coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
Appendix Table A14 presents results for weight in kg. Again, the results are 
consistent with the models for BMI. The IV models indicate that an additional 10 kg 
of weight reduces earnings by 27%, reduces the time spent employed by 7%, and 
raises the probability of receiving social income transfers by 11 percentage points.  
All 97 SNP IV point estimates in Table A14 are insignificant. 
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Appendix Table A7. The effect of BMI on contemporaneous labor market 
outcomes 
 
 2001 2007 2011 
OLS IV 
(32 SNP 
GRS) 
IV 
(97 
SNP 
GRS) 
OLS IV 
(32 SNP 
GRS) 
IV  
(97 
SNP 
GRS) 
OLS IV 
(32 SNP 
GRS) 
IV 
(97 
SNP 
GRS) 
Panel A: Log of Earnings 
          
BMI -0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.192* 
(0.104) 
-0.056 
(0.081) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
0.016 
(0.108) 
0.008 
(0.084) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.086) 
0.114 
(0.081) 
          
F-
statistics 
.. 36.53 58.92 .. 33.43 45.72 .. 39.05 44.03 
Mean 
outcome 
8.912 8.946 9.433 9.521 9.629 9.667 
N 2038 1886 1940 1492 1729 1406 
          
Panel B: Indicator for Being Employed 
          
BMI -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
          
F-
statistics 
.. 39.90 62.73 .. 35.18 46.19 .. 40.65 45.67 
Mean 
outcome 
0.807 0.810 0.885 0.894 0.906 0.909 
N 2062 1909 1957 1502 1742 1416 
          
Panel C: Indicator for Social Income Transfers (extensive margin) 
          
BMI 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.019) 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.010 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.011 
(0.015) 
          
F-
statistics 
.. 36.53 58.92 .. 33.49 45.72 .. 39.05 44.03 
Mean 
outcome 
0.367 0.364 0.334 0.326 0.291 0.277 
N 2038 1886 1940 1492 1729 1406 
Panel D: Log of Social Income Transfers (intensive margin) 
          
BMI 0.016 
(0.011) 
0.155 
(0.104) 
0.139* 
(0.071) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.127 
(0.136) 
0.039 
(0.071) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
0.060 
(0.081) 
0.090 
(0.075) 
          
F-
statistics 
.. 9.96 18.93 .. 6.12 17.88 .. 16.06 13.83 
Mean 
outcome 
7.726 7.721 7.853 7.795 7.893 7.909 
N 748 686 647 486 503 389 
 
Notes: The outcomes and BMI are measured in 2001, 2007 and 2011. All models include controls for 
the birth month and birth year effects. Gender and parental education (1980) are also controlled for in all 
models. The instrument used in the IV models is the BMI risk score, based on genetic markers. Angrist-
Pischke multivariate F-tests of excluded instrument are reported for the IV models. Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 
0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.   
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Appendix Table A8: 
Correlations between genetic risk scores for BMI and other diseases 
 
 Blood pressure GRS Total cholesterol GRS Triglycerides GRS 
BMI 32 
SNP GRS 
0.003 -0.009 -0.024 
BMI 97 
SNP GRS 
-0.001 -0.025 0.005 
 
Notes: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
N=2001. 
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Appendix Table A9: The effect of BMI on average labor market outcomes, 2001-
2012 with controls for other genetic markers 
 
Panel A: Log of Average Earnings, 
2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.073** 
(0.036) 
0.009 
(0.026) 
    
F-statistics … 36.69 63.24 
Mean outcome 9.860 9.860 9.864 
N 2001 2001 1849 
    
Panel B: Share of Years Employed, 
2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
    
F-statistics .. 40.09 67.46 
Mean outcome 0.857 0.857 0.859 
N 2024 2024 1871 
    
Panel C: Indicator for Social 
Income Transfers, 2001-2012 
(extensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.002 
(0.002) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
    
F-statistics .. 36.69 63.24 
Mean outcome 0.822 0.822 0.820 
N 2001 2001 1849 
    
Panel D: Log of Average Social 
Income Transfers, 2001-2012 
(intensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.005 
(0.009) 
0.063 
(0.068) 
-0.020 
(0.043) 
    
F-statistics .. 23.60 56.35 
Mean outcome 6.841 6.841 6.836 
N 1645 1645 1516 
 
Notes: Earnings are measured as the log of average earnings over the period 2001-2012. Employment is 
measured as the average share of employment years over the period 2001-2012. Indicator for social 
income transfers equals one for those who have received social security transfers at least once during 
2001-2012. Social income transfers are measured as the log of average transfers over the period 2001-
2012, conditional on obtaining a positive amount of transfers. The mean values for the dependent 
variables are reported. BMI is measured in 2001. All models include controls for the birth month and 
birth year effects. Gender and parental education (1980) and the genetic risk scores for blood pressure, 
total cholesterol, and triglycerides are also controlled for in all models. The instrument used in the IV 
models is the BMI risk score, based on genetic markers. Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-tests of excluded 
instrument are reported for the IV models. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level.      
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Appendix Table A10: 
The effect of BMI on average labor market outcomes, 2001-2012 with controls 
for cognitive performance 
 
Panel A: Log of Average 
Earnings, 2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP 
score 
IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.021 
(0.029) 
0.017 
(0.029) 
    
F-statistics … 34.63 45.62 
Mean outcome 9.956 9.956 9.964 
N 1334 1334 1237 
    
Panel B: Share of Years 
Employed, 2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP 
score  
IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
    
F-statistics .. 34.77 46.82 
Mean outcome 0.886 0.886 0.888 
N 1339 1339 1242 
    
Panel C: Indicator for Social 
Income Transfers, 2001-2012 
(extensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP 
score  
IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.003 
(0.003) 
0.024 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
    
F-statistics .. 34.63 45.62 
Mean outcome 0.813 0.813 0.812 
N 1334 1334 1237 
    
Panel D: Log of Average Social 
Income Transfers, 2001-2012 
(intensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP 
score  
IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI 0.002 
(0.011) 
0.058 
(0.061) 
-0.016 
(0.050) 
    
F-statistics .. 29.38 43.80 
Mean outcome 6.747 6.747 6.740 
N 1085 1085 1005 
 
Notes: Earnings are measured as the log of average earnings over the period 2001-2012. Employment is 
measured as the average share of employment years over the period 2001-2012. Indicator for social 
income transfers equals one for those who have received social security transfers at least once during 
2001-2012. Social income transfers are measured as the log of average transfers over the period 2001-
2012, conditional on obtaining a positive amount of transfers. The mean values for the dependent 
variables are reported. BMI is measured in 2001. All models include controls for the birth month and 
birth year effects. Gender and parental education (1980) are also controlled for in all models. The 
instrument used in the IV models is the BMI risk score, based on genetic markers. Angrist-Pischke 
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multivariate F-tests of excluded instrument are reported for the IV models. Heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; 
*** at the 0.01 level. 
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 Appendix Table A11: 
The effect of BMI on average labor market outcomes 2001-2012 for men 
 
Panel A: Log of Average 
Earnings, 2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.046 
(0.037) 
0.022 
(0.037) 
    
F-statistics .. 29.28 39.12 
Mean outcome 10.082 10.082 10.075 
N 929 929 859 
    
Panel B: Share of Years 
Employed, 2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
    
F-statistics .. 29.82 40.22 
Mean outcome 0.889 0.889 0.890 
N 937 937 866 
    
Panel C: Indicator for Social 
Income Transfers, 2001-2012 
(extensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.004 
(0.003) 
0.021 
(0.020) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
    
F-statistics .. 29.28 39.12 
Mean outcome 0.763 0.763 0.761 
N 929 929 859 
    
Panel D: Log of Average 
Social Income Transfers, 
2001-2012 (intensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.007 
(0.016) 
0.192* 
(0.105) 
0.000 
(0.068) 
    
F-statistics .. 15.88 34.13 
Mean outcome 6.260 6.260 6.245 
N 709 709 654 
 
Notes: Earnings are measured as the log of average earnings over the period 2001-2012. Employment is 
measured as the average share of employment years over the period 2001-2012. Indicator for social 
income transfers equals one for those who have received social security transfers at least once during 
2001-2012. Social income transfers are measured as the log of average transfers over the period 2001-
2012, conditional on obtaining a positive amount of transfers. The mean values for the dependent 
variables are reported. BMI is measured in 2001. All models include controls for the birth month and 
birth year effects. Parental education (1980) is also controlled for in all models. The instrument used in 
the IV models is the BMI risk score, based on genetic markers. Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-tests of 
excluded instrument are reported for the IV models. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 
level. 
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Appendix Table A12: 
 The effect of BMI on average labor market outcomes 2001-2012 for women 
 
Panel A: Log of Average 
Earnings, 2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.110 
(0.073) 
-0.005 
(0.039) 
    
F-statistics .. 10.04 21.99 
Mean outcome 9.679 9.679 9.692 
N 1109 1109 1027 
    
Panel B: Share of Years 
Employed, 2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.021 
(0.016) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
    
F-statistics .. 12.54 24.92 
Mean outcome 0.831 0.831 0.834 
N 1125 1125 1043 
    
Panel C: Indicator for Social 
Income Transfers, 2001-2012 
(extensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.051* 
(0.028) 
0.021 
(0.016) 
    
F-statistics ..   10.04 21.99 
Mean outcome 0.869 0.869 0.868 
N 1109 1109 1027 
    
Panel D: Log of Average 
Social Income Transfers, 
2001-2012 (intensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
BMI -0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.079 
(0.099) 
-0.034 
(0.062) 
    
F-statistics .. 8.17 20.26 
Mean outcome 7.260 7.260 7.262 
N 964 964 891 
 
Notes: Earnings are measured as the log of average earnings over the period 2001-2012. Employment is 
measured as the average share of employment years over the period 2001-2012. Indicator for social 
income transfers equals one for those who have received social security transfers at least once during 
2001-2012. Social income transfers are measured as the log of average transfers over the period 2001-
2012, conditional on obtaining a positive amount of transfers. The mean values for the dependent 
variables are reported. BMI is measured in 2001. All models include controls for the birth month and 
birth year effects. Parental education (1980) is also controlled for in all models. The instrument used in 
the IV models is the BMI risk score, based on genetic markers. Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-tests of 
excluded instrument are reported for the IV models. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 
level. 
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Appendix Table A13: 
The effect of obesity (BMI ≥ 30) on average labor market outcomes 2001-2012 
 
Panel A: Log of Average 
Earnings, 2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
Obesity (BMI ≥ 30)   -0.133* 
(0.068) 
-1.111* 
(0.568) 
0.176 
(0.465) 
    
F-statistics .. 24.70 31.34 
Mean outcome 9.863 9.863 9.866 
N 2038 2038 1886 
    
Panel B: Share of Years 
Employed, 2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
Obesity (BMI ≥ 30) -0.032* 
(0.019) 
-0.286* 
(0.146) 
-0.085 
(0.126) 
    
F-statistics .. 27.52 33.58 
Mean outcome 0.857 0.857 0.859 
N 2062 2062 1909 
    
Panel C: Indicator for Social 
Income Transfers, 2001-2012 
(extensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
Obesity (BMI ≥ 30) -0.024 
(0.027) 
0.464* 
(0.251) 
0.330 
(0.207) 
    
F-statistics .. 24.70 31.34 
Mean outcome 0.821 0.821 0.819 
N 2038 2038 1886 
    
Panel D: Log of Average 
Social Income Transfers, 
2001-2012 (intensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
Obesity (BMI ≥ 30) -0.003 
(0.115) 
1.009 
(1.149) 
-0.360 
(0.803) 
    
F-statistics .. 14.72 26.97 
Mean outcome 6.836 6.836 6.831 
N 1673 1673 1545 
 
Notes: Obesity indicator equals one for whose BMI was at least 30 in 2001. Earnings are measured as 
the log of average earnings over the period 2001-2012. Employment is measured as the average share of 
employment years over the period 2001-2012. Indicator for social income transfers equals one for those 
who have received social security transfers at least once during 2001-2012. Social income transfers are 
measured as the log of average transfers over the period 2001-2012, conditional on obtaining a positive 
amount of transfers. The mean values for the dependent variables are reported. All models include 
controls for the birth month and birth year effects. Gender and parental education (1980) are also 
controlled for in all models. The instrument used in the IV models is the BMI risk score, based on genetic 
markers. Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-tests of excluded instrument are reported for the IV models. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: * statistically significant at the 0.10 
level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Appendix Table A14: 
The effect of weight (kg) on average labor market outcomes 2001-2012 
 
Panel A: Log of Average 
Earnings, 2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
Weight (kg) -0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.027* 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
    
F-statistics .. 23.40 41.05 
Mean outcome 9.863 9.863 9.866 
N 2038 2038 1886 
    
Panel B: Share of Years 
Employed, 2001-2012 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
Weight (kg) -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
    
F-statistics .. 26.21 43.88 
Mean outcome 0.857 0.857 0.859 
N 2062 2062 1909 
    
Panel C: Indicator for Social 
Income Transfers, 2001-2012 
(extensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
Weight (kg) -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
    
F-statistics .. 23.40 41.05 
Mean outcome 0.821 0.821 0.819 
N 2038 2038 1886 
    
Panel D: Log of Average 
Social Income Transfers, 
2001-2012 (intensive margin) 
OLS IV – 32 SNP score  IV – 97 SNP 
score 
    
Weight (kg) -0.002 
(0.003) 
0.024 
(0.027) 
-0.007 
(0.016) 
    
F-statistics .. 14.02 35.62 
Mean outcome 6.836 6.836 6.831 
N 1673 1673 1545 
 
Notes: Weight (kg) is measured in 2001. Earnings are measured as the log of average earnings over the 
period 2001-2012. Employment is measured as the average share of employment years over the period 
2001-2012. Indicator for social income transfers equals one for those who have received social security 
transfers at least once during 2001-2012. Social income transfers are measured as the log of average 
transfers over the period 2001-2012, conditional on obtaining a positive amount of transfers. The mean 
values for the dependent variables are reported. All models include controls for the birth month and birth 
year effects. Gender and parental education (1980) are also controlled for in all models. The instrument 
used in the IV models is the BMI risk score, based on genetic markers. Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-
tests of excluded instrument are reported for the IV models. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses: * statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *** at the 
0.01 level. 
